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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2-(3)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue Presented: 
In cases under the "concealment" prong of the "discovery rule," where the 
concealment of a fact is alleged to be fraudulent, but the alleged concealment ends prior 
to the expiration of the statute of limitations, and where the injured party discovers the 
alleged fraudulently withheld fact prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, does 
the alleged fraudulent concealment still toll the statute of limitations? 
Standard of Review: Because this case is before the Court on motions to dismiss, 
the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are conclusions of law, reviewed 
for correctness. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). 
Issue Preserved for Appeal: This issue was central to both the trial court's ruling 
and the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Russell/Packard Development v. Carson, 2003 UT 
App. 316, Tf 11, 78 P.3d 616. The issue was first raised in Carson's motion to dismiss. 
[R. 31-52.] 
GOVERNING LAW 
The only statutory provision relevant to this appeal is Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 
(3), which provides that claims for breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, unjust 
enrichment, conversion and misappropriation, breach of principal-agency relationship and 
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intentional interference with prospective economic relations (the "four-year claims"), are 
subject to a four year statute of limitations. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. The case presents issues regarding the application of 
the discovery rule to the statue of limitations governing claims arising out of real estate 
contracts which were allegedly concealed from the plaintiffs. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below. In response to the 
original Complaint, each of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. [R. 29, 56, 51.] 
Plaintiffs responded by submitting a Memorandum and an Amended Complaint. [R. 58, 
72.] The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, heard defendants' motions to dismiss 
on April 29, 2003, and Judge Frederick dismissed the Amended Complaint in its entirety. 
[R. 149.] 
The plaintiffs appealed Judge Frederick's decision, and the Utah Court of Appeals, 
Judges Bench, Thorne and Billings, reversed the trial court's dismissal, and remanded the 
case for further proceedings. Russell/Packard Development v. Carson, 2003 UT App. 
316 at Tf 36. The defendants petitioned this Court for certiorari, which was granted. 
C Writ of Certiorari. The only issue on appeal to this Court is whether or not 
the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the statute of limitations was tolled on 
the plaintiffs' four-year claims. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS1 
1. Plaintiff Russell/Packard is a real estate development corporation engaged 
in the development and construction of residential homes. [R. 72 at If 1.] Plaintiff 
Russell and defendant Thomas were members of PRP, a Utah limited liability company. 
[R. 75 at t 18.] 
2. Carson and Bustos were real estate agents for Wardley Better Homes and 
Gardens. [R. 74 at | 10.] In the summer of 1996, Carson showed Thomas (who was 
acting for PRP), 72 lots for sale, located in the city of Saratoga Springs, Utah County. [R. 
76 at If 26.] 
3. PRP made an offer to purchase the Saratoga property, but not until after 
CMT, an entity which the Plaintiffs allege was a sham, had contracted to purchase the lots 
from Saratoga for $25,000 per lot (the "Saratoga-CMT transaction"). [R. 77 at ^ 33; R. 
80 at t 50.] 
4. On November 8, 1996, CMT resold the lots it had purchased from Saratoga 
to PRP, at a price of $30,000 per lot. [R. 79 at ffif 44, 45.] This real estate purchase 
contract was entered into by and between CMT and PRP. [Id.] Plaintiffs contend that 
this was a "flip sale" designed to benefit the defendants to the detriment of the Plaintiffs, 
and that it was not disclosed. [R. 72, ffi[ 77, 105]. Thus, despite receiving exactly what 
1
 The relevant facts are based on Plaintiffs5 First Amended Complaint, as this 
Court must accept the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint as true. E.g., Prows 
v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991). 
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they bargained for (i.e., the purchase of the Saratoga property from CMT for $30,000 per 
lot), Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the fall of 2001. [R. 1-18.] 
5. On or about April 1997, problems arose between Russell and Thomas, and 
in an effort to separate their business interests, Russell was assigned PRP's contract to 
purchase the Saratoga property from CMT for $30,000 per lot (the "CMT-Russell 
transaction"). [R. 68; 39-42]. 
6. In a series of closings commencing on or about July 1, 1997, Saratoga 
conveyed the Saratoga property to CMT, and CMT conveyed it to Plaintiff Russell. [R. 
43 - 45.] 
7. CMT had no relationship to Saratoga or PRP. [R. 80 at % 52.] However, 
Plaintiffs allege that they believed that when buying the property from CMT, they were 
actually buying from Saratoga - i.e., that CMT and Saratoga were one and the same.2 
8. Plaintiffs have alleged that they believed that CMT was the agent, under the 
control of, owned by, or was otherwise acting for Saratoga until the spring of 2000. [R. 
81 at f 55.] Plaintiffs aver in their Amended Complaint, Opposition to Defendants' 
2
 While not necessarily before this Court, Plaintiffs' allegation regarding why they 
believed CMT and Saratoga were one in the same is that "Defendants represented to 
Saratoga that CMT was part of, affiliated with, or owned by plaintiffs." [R. 82 at t 65 
(emphasis added).] Plaintiffs have further alleged that "Believing CMT was part of, 
affiliated with, or owned by PRP. Saratoga sold the lots to CMT for $25,000. . . ." [R. 82 
at TJ 68 (emphasis added).] The trial court dismissed the fraud claim because even 
assuming these allegations are true, the Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the claim. The 
Court of Appeals reversed this decision. 
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Motions to Dismiss, and at oral argument, however, that the alleged fraud was discovered 
in the spring of 2000. [Id.; R. 68; R. 207 at p.32 (emphasis added).] 
9. Following this discovery, in the spring of 2000, the Plaintiffs plead that they 
"were then placed on inquiry notice that CMT may not have been the agent or under the 
control of plaintiffs and, after discussions with Saratoga's representatives in the spring of 
2000, plaintiffs were first placed on inquiry notice of CMT's control status as well." [R. 
81 at f^ 58 (emphasis added).] 
10. The Plaintiffs stated in their opening brief before the Court of Appeals that 
they "learned for the first time in the spring of 2000 that CMT was not associated with 
Saratoga, which was approximately five months prior to expiration of the four year 
limitations period . . . ." [Brief of Appellants, p. 17]. Plaintiffs have also acknowledged 
that they were placed on "inquiry notice" regarding the alleged fraud in the spring of 
2000. [Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, p. 11; R. 69.] 
Finally, Plaintiffs have pleaded and admitted that any alleged "fraudulent concealment" 
ended in the spring of 2000. [R. 81, t 59.] 
11. The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges, "[a]fter the conversation with 
Saratoga's representative [in the spring of 2000] concerning CMT's actual status, further 
inquiry and investigation were made by the plaintiffs concerning the ownership and 
control of CMT and the circumstances of the two contracts signed in November 1996 by 
plaintiffs and Saratoga." [R. 82, ^  60.] The Plaintiffs provide no additional facts to 
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explain why it took them more than one and one half years to confirm or learn more about 
what Saratoga told Russell in the spring of 2000. Nevertheless, the original Complaint 
was not filed until after the statute of limitations had run on the claims, in November of 
2001. 
12. As set forth in the Court of Appeals opinion, the Plaintiffs concede 
that absent tolling, the four-year claims would have expired on November 7, 2000. 
Russell/Packard Development, 2003 UT App. 316, at f 11. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that because the Plaintiffs alleged 
fraudulent concealment, the statutes of limitations on the four-year claims were tolled 
despite the fact that the Plaintiffs were put on notice of their claims in the spring of 2000 
- several months before the statutes of limitations expired. Thus, because the Plaintiffs 
had sufficient knowledge of the facts underlying their claims prior to the running of the 
statutes of limitations, the claims are time barred. 
ARGUMENT 
Six of Plaintiffs' eight claims are subject to a four year statute of limitations: 
breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, conversion and 
misappropriation, breach of principal-agency relationship and intentional interference 
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with prospective economic relations.3 Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. The Court of 
Appeals held that because the Plaintiffs alleged fraudulent concealment, the running of 
the statute of limitations on each of the four-year claims was tolled. As set forth below, 
however, the Court of Appeals misapplied the discovery rule, and the Plaintiffs' claims 
are not saved from the statutes of limitations. 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THE FRAUDULENT 
CONCEALMENT PRONG OF THE DISCOVERY RULE APPLIES TO 
TOLL THE STATUE OF LIMITATIONS REGARDLESS OF INQUIRY OR 
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE. 
The Plaintiffs concede that because the real estate purchase contract between PRP 
and CMT was executed on November 8, 1996, that "absent tolling . . . its four-year 
claims expired on November 7, 2000, and thus its November 30, 2001 complaint was 
untimely." Russell/Packard Development, 2003 UT App. 316, at j^ 11. 
As the Court of Appeals correctly stated, a cause of action accrues and the statute 
of limitations begins to run upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the 
cause of action. Russell/Packard Development, 2003 UT App. 316, at ^ 12 (citing Spears 
v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, | 33, 44 P.3d 742); see also Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 
3
 With respect to the two additional claims, during oral argument before the Court 
of Appeals, the Plaintiffs conceded that the commercial bribery claim should be 
dismissed; however, the Court of Appeals failed to dismiss the claim in its ruling. [See 
Transcript of Court of Appeals' Hearing, p. 17, line 3.] Thus, this Court should dismiss 
the commercial bribery claim. With respect to Plaintiffs' fraud claim, because allegations 
of fraud implicate the internal discovery rule, the analysis regarding the tolling of the 
statute of limitations on the claim is different and therefore was not included in the 
Petition for Certiorari to this Court. 
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P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995). However, in some cases, "the discovery rule tolls the 
limitations period until facts forming the basis for the cause of action are discovered." 
Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, \ 32, 44 P.3d 742. Utah courts apply the discovery rule: 
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in situations 
where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the 
defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where the 
case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule 
would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has 
prevented the discovery of the cause of action. 
Id. (quoting Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)). There is no 
internal discovery rule in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3), and Plaintiffs have conceded 
that the exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule does not apply. This Court 
has granted certiorari, however, to address whether and how the concealment prong of the 
discovery rule applies to Plaintiffs' four-year claims. 
The question presented to this Court is: 
In cases under the "concealment" prong of the "discovery rule," where the 
concealment of a fact is alleged to be fraudulent, but the alleged concealment ends 
prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, and where the injured party 
discovers the alleged fraudulently withheld fact prior to the expiration of the 
statute of limitations, does the alleged fraudulent concealment still toll the statute 
of limitations? 
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at p.l. 
Several cases state that "the discovery rule does not apply to a plaintiff who 
becomes aware of his injuries or damages and a possible cause of action before the statute 
of limitations expires." Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc., 823 P.2d 1064, 1065 
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(Utah 1992).4 See also Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Construction Co., 744 P.2d 
1370, 1374 (Utah 1987); Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Utah 1998) ("In our 
view the discovery rule simply does not apply where the plaintiff, at some point during 
the limitations period has knowledge of the facts underlying his claim."). 
The Court of Appeals, however, found these cases unpersuasive because they do 
not distinguish between the fraudulent concealment and exceptional circumstances prongs 
of the discovery rule. Russell/Packard Development, 2003 UT App. 316, at ^ 15, n.7. In 
reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals held that the rule applies differently in cases 
of fraudulent concealment, reasoning that "the concealment prong of the discovery rule 
applies to toll the statute of limitations on the plaintiffs claims, regardless of inquiry or 
constructive notice." Russell/Packard Development, 2003 UT App. 316, at % 15 
(emphasis added). 
In Walker Drug Co., however, this Court held - directly to the contrary - that an 
allegation of fraudulent concealment makes no difference: 
The Walkers assert that the period of limitations was tolled until 1992 under both 
the exceptional-circumstances and concealment versions of the discovery rule. We 
disagree. 
4This is an inartful statement of what constitutes the discovery rule because the 
rule embraces "internal discovery rules," and also the "fraudulent concealment" and 
"exceptional circumstances" prongs, which are judge-made. Internal discovery rules do 
toll the statute of limitations until an actual discovery. However, the rule for the other 
judge-made discovery rules is that they do not apply if the discovery is made before the 
statute of limitations actually runs. 
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Before a period of limitations may be tolled under either of these versions 
of the discovery rule, an initial showing must be made that the plaintiff did 
not know and could not reasonably have discovered the facts underlying the 
cause of action in time to commence an action within that period. 
Id. at 1231 (emphasis added). The Court concluded as follows: 
We conclude, as a matter of law, that the Walkers have not met their initial 
burden to show that they did not know and could not have discovered the 
facts underlying their causes of action in time to file their complaint within 
the statutory period of limitations commencing in 1986. 
Id. at 1232. 
The application of this rule to fraudulent concealment cases is confirmed in 
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 55 (Utah 1996) (quoting language from Walker Drug 
above). In O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1991), this Court 
confirmed the reasoning set forth in Walker Drug, finding that trial court erred because it 
applied the standard to determine whether unjust concealment was established "without 
first focusing on a prerequisite to any application of the discovery rule/' Id. at 1144. The 
Supreme Court further stated that "an analysis of Myers [v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 
1981)] and other of our discovery cases demonstrates that all have required such a 
showing as a threshold matter . . ..". Id. (emphasis added). 
Thus, contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals, Walker Drug dictates that 
the Plaintiffs must make a threshold showing that they did not know and could not have 
known of the existence of a cause of action prior to the running of the statutes of 
limitations. The Plaintiffs admit to the contrary. Indeed, they plainly admit that they 
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discovered the fact allegedly concealed in the spring of 2000. [Statement of Facts ^ 8 ]. 
The Plaintiffs further admit that they were on inquiry notice in the spring of 2000, [Id. at 
% 9], and that the concealment ended in the spring of 2000. [Id. at ^ 10]. Thus, the 
discovery rule does not toll the running of the statute of limitations. 
The Court of Appeals relies on a number of inapplicable cases for the proposition 
that the fraudulent concealment itself tolls the statute of limitations. All of these cases are 
distinguishable on the same ground - that the alleged fraudulent concealment prevented 
the plaintiff from having any notice of the claim until after the statute of limitations 
expired. See Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16, at 117, 28 P.3d 1271, 1276 (plaintiff suffered a 
loss in 1989, but was not aware of the concealment until July 1995); Chapman v. Primary 
Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989) (defendants continued to misrepresent 
information to the plaintiff even after the statute of limitation would have run). In this 
case, by contrast, the alleged concealment ended nearly six months before the statute of 
limitations had run. [Statement of Facts U 10]. 
The Plaintiffs have alleged that "in the spring of 2000 (roughly six months before 
the statute of limitations was to expire on the four-year claims), an accountant for 
Saratoga questioned the ownership or control status of CMT. . . [and] plaintiffs were first 
placed on inquiry notice of CMT's control status as well." [R. 81 at ffi[ 57, 58.] At this 
point, according to Plaintiffs' pleading, they knew - contrary to what they allege they 
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previously believed to be the case - that CMT was a completely distinct entity from 
Saratoga. As Plaintiffs' counsel put the matter during oral argument: 
We have alleged that we have a fraud in 1996, and we have alleged that we 
didn't discover it in 2000 until the final take down of the last twelve lots 
where someone in Saratoga's organization is going through the 
paperwork - and we plead this. 
[R. 207 at p. 32.] 
The Plaintiffs thus admit that the facts supporting their claim were discovered in 
the spring of 2000, at least six months before the statute of limitations ran on any of the 
four-year claims. Consequently, there is no basis for tolling the statute of limitations with 
respect to the four-year claims. As a consequence, the statute expired on November 7, 
2000. The Complaint was not filed until November 30, 2001. 
II. THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO SHOW THAT GIVEN DEFENDANTS' 
PURPORTED ACTIONS, THEY COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT HAVE 
DISCOVERED THE CLAIMS EARLIER. 
In their Amended Complaint and throughout the course of the proceedings below, 
the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the applicable test set forth in Walker Drug - they have 
failed to make an initial showing that they "did not know and could not reasonably have 
discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action within 
that period." Walker Drug, 902 P.2d at 1231. 
Utah courts have long recognized that the means of knowledge is the equivalent of 
knowledge: 
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Whatever notice is enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard and 
call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led. 
When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed 
conversant of it. 
U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General Inc., 1999 UT App. 303, \ 36, 990 P.2d 945, 954 {citing 
First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 837-838 (Utah 1998)). The 
Utah courts have further articulated that: 
[A]ll that is required to trigger the statute of limitations is sufficient information to 
put plaintiffs on notice to make further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions. 
Once inquiry notice triggers the accrual of the statute of limitations, a claimant 
may not then toll the running of the statue under the principle of exceptional 
circumstances. 
Macris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43 at | 8, 24 P.3d 984, 990. While Maoris 
is an exceptional circumstances case, Walker Drug instructs that the test is the same. The 
Plaintiffs admitted throughout the proceeding below that they had sufficient information 
to put them on notice to make further inquiry in the spring of 2000, before the running of 
the statute of limitations, precisely because they harbored doubts or questions. [Statement 
of Facts If 11.] 
It is true that the Plaintiffs asserted to the Court of Appeals that they "did not 
discover actual facts forming the basis for their causes of action until after the November 
7, 2001 [sic] deadline." Even assuming this is true, however, the discovery of actual facts 
is not the test, nor is there any factual basis to support this statement. The Plaintiffs had a 
duty to make an initial showing in the trial court that they "did not know and could not 
reasonably have discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence 
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an action within that period." Walker Drug, 902 P.2d at 1231. The Plaintiffs have failed 
in this duty. 
The Plaintiffs' purported injury is based on contracts made in 1996. In June of 
2000, the alleged misrepresentations were brought to Plaintiffs' attention by Saratoga. 
[Statement of Facts f^ 9]. Hence, all the Plaintiffs needed to do to become fully aware 
that they suffered what they believed to be an injury was to ask Saratoga for a copy of the 
Saratoga-CMT contract (as Russell already had a copy of the CMT-Russell contract). 
There is no reason this could not have been done in June. The contracts would have 
disclosed the difference in purchase price, and Carson's role as an agent. The record 
offers no insight into what hindered discovery of any additional facts needed to file this 
action. Not only is there is no allegation of anything having happened after the spring of 
2000 to hinder his investigation but the Plaintiffs plead and admit that the concealment 
ended in the spring of 2000. Thus, the Plaintiffs have not pled, nor made any showing, 
that they could not have discovered the fraud in time to commence the action within the 
limitations period. The knowledge of the fraud and the allegation that in the spring of 
2000 the alleged concealment ended is sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiffs have failed 
to make the initial showing, under this Court's holdings, that the statutes of limitations 
should be tolled. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs admit they discovered the alleged fraudulently withheld fact prior to 
the expiration of the statute of limitations, and also that the alleged concealment ended 
prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Consequently, the decision of the trial 
court dismissing the Amended Complaint on the four-year claims should be affirmed, and 
the decision of the Court of Appeals should be vacated. The commercial bribery claim 
should also be dismissed based on the proceedings below.5 
DATED this 2 ^ d a y of February, 2004. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROGiWLMcDONOUGH PC 
George W. Pratt 
Ali Levin 
Attorneys for Appellee John Thomas 
5 The only remaining claim would be Plaintiffs' fraud claim, the First Cause of 
Action of their Amended Complaint. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. STEPHENS: If it please the Court, I'm 
Brent Stephens of the law firm of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau, and the plaintiff and the appellants in this 
case. 
And the relief sought here is a reversal, 
speedily, I hope, of the granting of the defendants1 
and all three of them, motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. 
Now, either I was incomprehensible in the 
court below, or Judge Frederick became confused as to 
what I was claiming, or -- probably both, or perhaps 
even because of the defendants' sophisticated but 
thoughtless arguments. 
The motion of the defendants was not well 
taken at all. 
The facts are these. And this is a 
common-law, broad, garden-variety case. 
The plaintiffs are developers of real estate 
in -- from California originally. They take plats and 
they build houses on them. 
Thomas, one of the defendants, who was a 
local builder here, was approached by Russell to form a 
company called PRP Limited Liability Company, to do the 
16 
MR. MEADE: Well, you have the Frandsen 
case, where the period of time was very close to what 
we're dealing with here. I think it was six months. 
And that's where we are. 
And, again, it's based -- the discovery rule 
in the four-year statute is -- is strictly an equitable 
instrument that would extend the period of time if you 
don't have the opportunity to file it within the 
four-year statute of limitations. 
JUDGE THORNE: So in your view, that washes 
out the six claims? We've got two left, is that 
right? 
MR. MEADE: You've got two left. 
JUDGE THORNE: Okay. 
MR. MEADE: So one of the two is the 
commercial bribery claim. And that -- and Mr. Pratt 
argued that in the brief. And it's not really even 
been responded to in the briefing. And I think the 
Court needs to assume that the plaintiffs concede that 
this commercial bribery claim just doesn't exist, 
because -- for the reasons that Mr. Pratt argued in his 
brief. 
Then you have the fraud claim. And I think 
the fraud claim was properly dismissed for a number of 
reasons. One -- only one of which has to do with the 
1 / 
statute of limitations. 
Let me back up — 
MR. STEPHENS: We'll concede the commercial 
bribery claim. 
JUDGE THORNE: Did Judge Frederick explain 
why he dismissed these, or are you trying to dealve 
into possibilities? 
MR. MEADE: Well, he -- I think his ruling 
was fairly limited except for the reasons set forth in 
the memorandum, and in the arguments. 
And I'm not advancing anything that wasn't 
argued to Judge Frederick. 
I mean, he doesn't --he did not, it's my 
recollection, go into detail on the fraud claim. 
I will -- you know, there was a motion made 
inviting him to reconsider his ruling by the plaintiff. 
And, you know, I'm sure he looked at it, and 
went back, and he ruled, you know, that his prior 
ruling stood. 
So no more detail than that. 
Initially we argued at the trial court, and 
argued here, that the fraud claim was not pled with 
sufficient particularity, and, more importantly, that 
some of the elements of fraud are missing. Mainly, 
that there was some kind of a representation made to 
1 
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18 
Russell by any of these defendants. There is simply no 
allegation in the complaint that there was this type of 
misrepresentation. 
And if Russell was confused, or didn't pay 
attention to the details of the transaction, that 
doesn't turn it into fraud. 
In paragraph 65 of the amended complaint --
here is the allegation of misrepresentation. 
Defendants represented to Saratoga that CMT 
was part of, affiliated with, or owned by the 
plaintiffs. 
So their fraud claim is based on some 
alleged misrepresentation made to the seller, not to 
Russell. 
Now -- and this was made in an amended 
pleading, so I think they have to assume that they're 
doing the best they can. 
And I think it would be important to 
consider the situation of the parties in the 
transaction. 
Russell is not a party to the transaction. 
Russell and Thomas are members of the limited liability 
company PRP. 
It's admitted in the amended complaint that 
Thomas was an agent and fiduciary of Mr. Russell in his 
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
fl Russell/Packard Development, Inc., and Lawrence Russell 
(collectively, Russell) appeal from the district court's order 
granting motions to dismiss in favor of Joel Carson, William 
Bustos, and John Thomas. We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 In 1996, Lawrence Russell was the principal shareholder and 
chief executive officer of Russell/Packard Development, Inc., a 
California corporation1 engaged in real estate development in 
California. When Mr. Russell became interested in developing 
residential real estate in Utah, he teamed with John Thomas 
(Thomas), a Utah real estate agent and a managing member of 
Premier Homes, L.C., to organize a Utah limited liability company 
called PRP Development, L.C. (PRP). Thomas was the manager of 
PRP and hence a fiduciary of Russell and PRP. PRP began pursuing 
real estate development activities in Utah. 
f3 In 1996, Saratoga Springs Development, L.C. (Saratoga), a 
company owned by Lynn Wardley, was developing and marketing land 
for residential construction. Saratoga owned seventy-two 
undeveloped twin-home lots (the lots) in the city of Saratoga 
Springs, Utah. Saratoga retained the brokerage services of 
Wardley Better Homes and Gardens Brokerage Co. (Wardley) to 
market and sell the lots. Dan Cary (Cary), a Wardley agent, was 
the listing agent for the lots. Joel Carson (Carson) and William 
Bustos (Bustos) were also real estate agents with Wardley. 
Unbeknownst to Russell, Carson had a business relationship with 
Bustos and Bustos had previously engaged in real estate dealings 
with Thomas. Also unbeknownst to Russell, Thomas owed Bustos 
money from previous business dealings. Thomas retained Carson on 
behalf of PRP and Russell to locate and review real estate 
proposals for purchase and development by PRP. As such, Carson 
became a fiduciary of PRP. 
1[4 In the summer of 1996, Carson, Thomas, and Bustos learned of 
the availability of the Saratoga lots. At the urging of Carson 
and Bustbs, Thomas approached Cary about purchasing the lots from 
Saratoga through PRP. 
f5 However, in the fall of 1996, Carson, Thomas, and Bustos, 
through an entity known as CMT, Inc. (CMT), made a separate offer 
to purchase the lots from Saratoga for $25,000 per lot. Carson 
told Cary that CMT was affiliated with or owned by Russell and 
PRP. Throughout the negotiations, Carson and Thomas, through 
their actions and representations to Saratoga, created the 
appearance that PRP was actively pursuing the purchase of the 
lots. Consequently, Wardley and Saratoga believed they were 
negotiating the purchase of the lots with PRP directly. To 
further disguise CMT's illegitimacy, Carson, Thomas, and Bustos 
misappropriated Russell's proprietary plans to develop the lots 
and presented them to Saratoga as their own. As a result of the 
same conduct, Russell erroneously believed CMT was owned by, 
affiliated with, or part of Saratoga. 
1. Russell/Packard Development, Inc., was licensed through the 
Utah Department of Commerce to do business in Utah as a foreign 
corporation. 
%6 In fact, during the negotiations and execution of the PRP 
contract, CMT was merely a fictitious name used by Carson, 
Thomas, and Bustos, having no legal status in Utah or elsewhere.2 
On November 4, 1996, CMT and Saratoga executed a real estate 
contract listing Cary as the agent for Saratoga and Carson as the 
agent for CMT. The CMT contract was signed by Saratoga's 
authorized agent and by "Charles Perez" on behalf of CMT.3 
Saratoga and CMT closed on the CMT contract the same day they 
executed it, with Saratoga still erroneously believing it was 
contracting with PRP through PRP's affiliate, CMT. The title 
company CMT used to close the transaction received an earnest 
money wire in the amount of $10,000 from an entity known as Poe 
Investments, L.C. (Poe), whose members were Carson and Bustos. 
At closing. Bustos received a check for part of this $10,000 
earnest money payment. 
1(7 After the CMT contract closed on November 4, 1996, Thomas-
acting for PRP--made an offer to purchase the lots from CMT for 
$30,000 per lot. PRP and CMT executed a real estate contract 
(the PRP contract) on November 8, 1996. Thomas signed on behalf 
of PRP. "Charles Perez" again signed on behalf of CMT. Carson 
acted as the real estate agent for both PRP and CMT on the PRP 
contract. The terms of the PRP contract were identical to those 
of the CMT contract, except that the price per lot was $5,000 
higher. By failing to reveal to Russell, PRP, and Saratoga that 
they were acting as agents and principals for CMT at the same 
time they were acting as agents and fiduciaries of Russell and 
PRP, Carson, Thomas, and Bustos successfully effectuated a "flip 
purchase and sale," and pocketed $360,000 in the process. 
Neither Russell nor Saratoga knew what had occurred. However, 
CMT was listed as the seller both in the PRP contract and in the 
chain of title on the lots. 
f8 In spring 2000, an accountant for Saratoga questioned CMT's 
true role in the 1996 transactions involving the lots.5 
2. CMT, Inc. was incorporated as a California corporation on 
December 5, 1996, after the CMT contract was signed. CMT has 
never been registered to do business in the state of Utah. 
3. A person named "Charles Perez" is believed to have been 
associated with CMT, though Russell alleges it is unsure how. 
4. Poe was organized in Utah on July 19, 1996, and involuntarily 
dissolved on August 22, 1997. 
5. By this time, Russell and Thomas had dissolved PRP. In the 
1997 dissolution, Russell purchased all rights, title, and 
interest in the PRP contract, including the right to purchase the 
(continued...) 
Suspecting a "flip purchase and sale" had occurred, Saratoga 
initiated discussions with Russell wherein Russell learned for 
the first time that CMT was not an agent for Saratoga. 
Subsequently, Russell conducted further investigation concerning 
the ownership and control of CMT and the circumstances 
surrounding PRP!s purchase of the lots. 
H9 On November 30, 2001, Russell filed a complaint against 
Carson, Thomas, and Bustos alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary 
duty as to Carson and Thomas, civil conspiracy to defraud, 
commercial bribery, unjust enrichment, conversion and 
misappropriation of proprietary property, breach of principal-
agent relationship as to Carson and Thomas, and intentional 
interference with prospective economic relations. Carson, 
Thomas, and Bustos filed motions to dismiss asserting a number of 
grounds for dismissal. On June 10, 2002, the district court 
dismissed Russell's claims with prejudice. Russell appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1fl0 Russell argues the district court erred in dismissing its 
claims against Carson, Thomas, and Bustos (collectively, the 
Appellees). "When determining whether a trial court properly 
granted a rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss, we accept the factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff." Saint Benedict's Dev. Co. v. Saint 
Benedicts Hosp. , 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) . "Because the 
propriety of a 12(b) (6) dismissal is a question of law, we give 
the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a 
correctness standard." Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 
264 (Utah 1995) (quotations and citations omitted). We "will 
affirm the trial court's decision only if it appears [Russell] 
cannot prove any set of facts in support of [its] claims." 
Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) J 
5 . (...continued) 
lots pursuant to the terms of the contract. 
6. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "[t]he 
[district] court shall . . . issue a brief written statement of 
the ground for its decision on all motions granted under . . . 
12(b)." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)). 
While rule 52(a) allows for brevity in such supporting 
statements, we have specifically condemned the practice employed 
by the district court in this case wherein the court merely 
grants the motion "for the reasons set forth in the [prevailing 
(continued...) 
ANALYSIS 
I. Timeliness of Claims 
A. Statutes of Limitations 
Ull Under Utah law, Russell's claim for fraud is subject to a 
three-year statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
26(3) (2002). Russell's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, 
civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, conversion and 
misappropriation, breach of principal-agent relation, and 
intentional interference with prospective economic relations 
(collectively, the four-year claims) are subject to a four-year 
statute of limitations. See id. § 78-12-25(3) (2002). Russell 
concedes that, absent tolling, its fraud claim expired on 
November 7, 1999, its four-year claims expired on November 7, 
2000, and thus its November 30, 2001 complaint was untimely. 
B. The Discovery Rule 
1Jl2 In most cases "a cause of action accrues" and the "statutes 
of limitations begin running upon the happening of the last event 
necessary to complete the cause of action." Spears v. Warr, 2002 
UT 24,1(33, 44 P.3d 742 (quotations and citations omitted). 
Moreover, "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action 
does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations." 
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992) 
(quotations and citations omitted). Russell concedes that, 
absent tolling through application of the discovery rule, "the 
point at which [Russell] reasonably should [have] known" of its 
legal injuries is November 8, 1996, the day PRP and CMT executed 
the PRP contract. Spears, 2002 UT 24 at ^32. 
1|l3 However, in some cases, "the discovery rule tolls the 
limitations period until facts forming the basis for the cause of 
action are discovered." Id. Utah courts apply the discovery 
rule 
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is 
mandated by statute; (2) in situations where 
6. (..- continued) 
party's] supporting memorandum . . . [without] explain[ing] the 
basis for its decision." Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2001 
UT App 277,1(9, 34 P. 3d 234. Given the complexity of the issues 
in this case, we could reverse and remand based solely on the 
district court's failure to explain the basis of its decision. 
However, in the interest of expediting this case, we proceed to 
the merits. Nonetheless, we urge trial courts to explain the 
basis of their decisions when there are multiple issues before 
the court. 
a plaintiff does not become aware of the 
cause of action because of the defendant's 
concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in 
situations where the case presents 
exceptional circumstances and the application 
of the general rule would be irrational or 
unjust, regardless of any showing that the 
defendant has prevented the discovery of the 
cause of action. 
Id. (quoting Warren, 838 P.2d at 1129). Russell contends the 
limitation periods were tolled because: (1) the discovery rule 
applies to a claim for fraud by statutory mandate; and (2) the 
Appellees' concealment justifies application of the concealment 
prong of uhe discovery rule to Russell's four-year claims. 
1. Fraudulent Concealment 
1l4 In Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996), our supreme 
court noted that in cases not involving allegations of 
concealment, inquiry notice on the part of the plaintiff is 
enough to trigger the running of the limitations period. See id. 
at 51-52 (citing United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City, 
Co., 870 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah 1993) (refusing to toll the statute 
of limitations where a proxy statement provided sufficient 
information to put shareholders on notice of the need for further 
inquiry)). Hence, absent concealment, the statutes of 
limitations on Russell's claims began running in 1996 when 
Russell was put on notice of CMT's involvement by the PRP 
contract's closing papers and the subsequently recorded deeds. 
See Johannessen v. Canyon Road Towers Owners Ass'n, 2 0 02 UT App 
332,^(23, 57 P. 3d 1119 ("Constructive notice is imparted when 
documents are properly recorded." (quotations and citation 
omitted)). 
[^15 "However, under our case law the rule is otherwise when a 
plaintiff alleges that a defendant took affirmative steps to 
conceal the plaintiff's cause of action . . . ." Berenda, 914 
P.2d at 51. In such a situation, the concealment prong of the 
discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations on the 
plaintiff's claims, regardless of inquiry or constructive notice. 
See Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1365 (Utah 1996). "[U]nder 
the discovery rule, 'it is the knowledge of injury' which 
triggers the statute, 'not notice of probable or possible 
injury.'" Id. (citation omitted). If the plaintiff can make "a 
prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then 
demonstrate that, given the defendant's actions, a reasonable 
plaintiff would not have discovered the claim earlier," the 
statute of limitations is tolled. Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51 
(citing Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 
1978) (holding that the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the 
c 
defendant's misrepresentations tolled the statute of limitations 
until discovery of the cause of the damage) (other citations 
omitted)).7 
a. Threshold Issue 
Hl6 "The first step in determining whether the discovery rule 
applies is to examine whether [Russell] made the threshold 
showing that [Russell] did not know, nor should have known," of 
7. The Appellees continue to argue that because Russell was put 
on notice of its claims in spring of 2000--several months before 
the four-year statutes of limitations expired in summer 2000--
Russell was obligated to file its complaint before the running of 
the statute. The Appellees reason that because Russell did not 
file its complaint until November 2001, Russell's claims are 
time-barred. To support this reasoning, the Appellees cite 
Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 823 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1992) and 
Bricrham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Construction Co. , 744 P.2d 1370 
(Utah 1987). However, both of these cases are factually
 f 
distinguishable from this case because neither involved 
allegations of fraudulent concealment. 
In Atwood, the supreme court held that "[w]hile the 
discovery rule has often been applied to give a plaintiff the 
opportunity to file his action after learning certain critical 
facts, the discovery rule has no application here" where the 
plaintiff "d[id] not suggest any reason why the action could not 
have been filed between the spring of 1988"--when the plaintiff 
learned of his cause of action--"and October 11 of that year"— 
when the statute of limitations expired on his claim. 823 P.2d 
at 1065. Unlike the plaintiff in Atwood, Russell has alleged 
fraudulent concealment as the reason Russell could not file its 
claims prior to summer 2000. 
In Brigham Young, the supreme court refused to apply the 
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations because the 
plaintiff "knew of its cause of action . . . three and a half 
years before the limitations period expired," and where "an 
action easily could have been filed between the date of discovery 
and the end of the limitation period." 744 P.2d at 1374. Again, 
unlike Russell, the plaintiff in Bricrham Young did not allege 
fraudulent concealment as a justification for filing suit after 
the statute of limitations ostensibly expired. 
Hence, in Atwood and Brigham Young, the supreme court 
refused to apply the discovery rule because there were no 
allegations of fraud and because in both cases the plaintiffs 
could have ""filed" prior to the running of the limitations period. 
Our reading of Utah law leads us to conclude that this rule does 
not apply here where Russell alleged fraudulent concealment. As 
we discuss in detail later in this section, we conclude that 
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996), controls this case. 
its causes of action against the Appellees prior to being put on 
notice of a potential fraudulent transaction by Saratoga in 
spring 2000. Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 
1995); see also O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs., 821 P.2d 
1139, 1144 (Utah 1991) (noting that "a threshold showing that 
[the plaintiff] did not know and could not reasonably have known 
of the existence of a cause of action . . . seem[s] a 
definitional prerequisite to reliance on any version of the 
discovery rule"). 
Hl7 The Utah Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff's actual 
knowledge of a cause of action prevents the plaintiff from 
satisfying the threshold showing. See O'Neal, 821 P.2d at 1144 
(citing. Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. Co., 744 P.2d 
1370, 1374 (Utah 1983); Auerbach Co. v. Key Sec. Police, Inc., 
680 P.2d 740, 743-44 (Utah 1984); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. 
Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1987); Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 
1288, 1290-91 (Utah 1983)). In the case before us, neither party 
alleges, nor does the record reflect, that Russell had or should" 
have had actual knowledge of its claims against the Appellees at 
the time of the execution of the PRP contract. 
Hl8 However, there is no dispute that the PRP contract and the 
deeds for the lots indicate CMT's involvement in the 
transactions. The Appellees argue that because CMT was named in 
these documents, Russell should have been aware of its injury and 
cannot satisfy the threshold showing. 
1fl9 The; case of Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629 (Utah 
1995), is instructive. In Sevy, the plaintiffs satisfied the 
threshold showing even where there were "some undisputed facts 
indicat[ing] that [the plaintiffs] should have become aware of 
their injury at closing." Id. at 634, 636 (quotations and 
'citation omitted). In that case, the plaintiff was awarded 
damages by the district court for a title company's negligent 
failure to deliver stock certificates to the plaintiff at 
closing, pursuant to the terms of a real estate purchase 
contract. See id. at 631. Even though the statute of 
limitations would normally have run on the plaintiff's claim, the 
plaintiff asserted the discovery rule applied to toll the statute 
of limitations. See id. at 634. The plaintiff contended that he 
met the discovery rule's threshold showing--that he did not and 
8. Because the certificates were never delivered, the 
plaintiff's security interest in the shares was not perfected and 
because of subsequent transfers of the stock certificates, a 
third party sought to foreclose on the stock and sued to have the 
district court declare the third party's security interest was 
valid, perfected, and free from claims by the plaintiff. See 
S e w v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 631 (Utah 1995). 
should not have known of the negligence at the time of closing--
because the recording of a trust deed led him to believe his 
security interest was perfected regardless of the defendant title 
company's failure to deliver the stock certificates. See id. at 
636. The defendant title company argued that the plaintiff 
should have known of the negligence, and that his security 
interest was not perfected at closing when no stock certificates 
were forthcoming. See id. at 634. Noting that the district 
court's finding was a question of fact, see id. at 634, the Sew 
court affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that despite 
evidence tending to show that the plaintiff should have known of 
his claim upon the defendant title company's failure to deliver 
the stock certificates, the plaintiff "neither knew nor should 
have known of [the defendant title company's] negligence until 
after the statute of limitations period had run." Id. at 63 6. 
1(20 Similarly in our case, Russell alleges that despite the 
presence of CMT's name in the closing documents and the recorded 
deeds, Russell did not and should not have known of its claims at 
closing, and therefore that the threshold requirement is met for 
application of the discovery rule. Russell argues it is 
commonplace to use multiple legal entities in complex development 
transactions, and therefore the Appellees' use of CMT's name did 
not, of itself, alert Russell of any potential or actual 
problems. Because of the standard of review on a rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal, we accept Russell's assertions that it should not have 
known of its claims simply because CMT was listed in the PRP 
contract and the deeds. Hence, we conclude Russell has satisfied 
the threshold showing for purposes of surviving a motion to 
dismiss. 
b. The Concealment Prong of the Discovery Rule 
H21 Our supreme court has held that application of the 
concealment prong of the discovery rule to toll a statute of 
limitations requires the plaintiff to "make a prima facie showing 
of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrate that, given the 
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have 
discovered his or her claim earlier." Berenda v. Langford, 914 
P.2d 45, 53 (Utah 1996). This standard requires consideration of 
"the difficulty a plaintiff may have in recognizing and 
diligently discovering a cause of action when a defendant 
affirmatively and fraudulently conceals it." Id. at 54. 
Significantly, the Berenda court "explicitly acknowledge[d] that 
weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct in light 
of the defendant's steps to conceal the cause of action 
necessitates the type of factual findings which preclude summary 
judgment in all but the clearest of cases." Id. at 53. "Close 
calls are for juries, not judges, to make." Id. at 54 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
H22 To support the contention that the Appellees concealed their 
wrongful conduct after defrauding Russell via the "flip purchase 
and sale," Russell alleges in its complaint that: 
[] At the time the CMT contract, signed 
on November 4, 1996, and the PRP contract, 
signed on November 8, 1996, were executed, 
Carson, Bustos, and Thomas set on a course of 
conduct through agreement to conceal from 
plaintiffs and Saratoga CMT's relationship to 
the defendants and CMT's lack of relationship 
to the plaintiffs and Saratoga. 
[] This concealment was a necessary-
part of the scheme and device to permit the 
CMT contract to be signed by Saratoga on 
November 4, 1996, and to "flip the sale" to 
PRP on November 8, 1996. 
[] This intentional concealment and 
failure to disclose to plaintiffs the fact 
that CMT was not owned by or controlled 
through Saratoga or, as to Saratoga, CMT was 
not owned by or in the control of plaintiffs, 
plaintiffs and Saratoga would not have 
permitted the flip purchase and sale through 
CMT while Carson and Thomas were acting as 
agents and fiduciaries of plaintiffs or to 
benefit Bustos. 
[] Plaintiffs did not discover that CMT 
was not the agent for . . . Saratoga, in 
connection with the sale of the lots, until 
spring of 2000, when an accountant working 
for Saratoga discovered the possibility of a 
flip sale and purchase which prompted 
discussions between Russell on the one hand, 
and a representative of Saratoga on the other 
hand. 
[] At all times previous to that, 
defendant formulated a scheme in which 
plaintiffs were introduced to Saratoga by the 
defendants and always referred to as the 
builder or buyer, and Saratoga's 
representatives were introduced to plaintiffs 
by the defendants and always referred to as 
the seller or developer. 
[] On information and belief, in the 
spring of 2000, an accountant for Saratoga 
questioned the ownership or control status of 
CMT, in connection with the . . . closing of 
the last twelve lots [under the PRP 
contract] . 
[] This affirmative conduct and 
concealment of the defendants constituted a 
pattern during October and November 1996 
during the sale and continued thereafter 
through spring of 2 0 00 that CMT was known 
only to plaintiffs as Saratoga's agent or 
company owned by or under the control of 
Saratoga. The active concealment continued 
until spring of 2000 by the defendants. 
[] After the conversation with 
Saratoga's representatives concerning CMT's 
actual status, further inquiry and 
investigations were made by plaintiffs 
concerning the ownership and control of CMT 
and the circumstances of the two contracts 
signed in November 1996 by plaintiffs and 
Saratoga. 
H23 We look to pertinent case law for guidance in determining 
whether these allegations are sufficient to support fraudulent 
concealment by the Appellees and reasonable action in the face 
thereof by Russell. 
124 In Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16, 28 P.3d 1271, the district 
court granted summary judgment9 in favor of the defendants on the 
9. Only in the context of summary judgment have Utah appellate 
courts addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff successfully 
made the prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then 
demonstrated that, in light of the defendant's actions, a 
reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the cause of 
action sooner. In such cases, Utah appellate courts examined the 
pleadings and factual evidence relating to when the plaintiffs 
would reasonably have been on notice that further inquiry was 
needed and whether the plaintiff, once on notice, reasonably 
should have discovered the facts despite the defendants" efforts 
to hide them. See, e.g., Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16,1(18-20, 28 
P.3d 1271; Berenda v. Lancrsford, 914 P.2d 45, 51, 54 (Utah 1996); 
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1130-31 (Utah 1992); 
Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 
1989) . In this case, however, we are reviewing a grant of a 
(continued...) 
basis of an expired statute of limitations. See id. at %l. On 
appeal, the supreme court found that the plaintiff "met her 
burden of making a prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment" 
where the plaintiff submitted affidavits from five different 
people to bolster her allegations that the defendants had taken 
affirmative steps to conceal her cause of action. Id. at Hl9. 
'She also alleged two meetings in which the defendants lied to her 
regarding the whereabouts of her stolen money. See id. 
Accordingly, the supreme court reversed summary judgment and 
remanded for the district court to weigh the reasonableness of 
the plaintiff's conduct in the face of the defendant's fraudulent 
concealment to determine whether the concealment prong of the 
discovery rule applied to toll the statute of limitations on the 
plaintiff's claims. See id', at H1J17-22. 
^25 At first glance, the concealment in Hill appears more 
egregious than the concealment pled by Russell in this case. 
However, on closer examination, Carson and Thomas had fiduciary 
obligations to Russell with the attendant "duty to speak the 
truth." Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 0.186 
(Utah 1989). Therefore, material omissions such as Carson's and 
Thomas's failure to disclose to Russell the true involvement of 
CMT are similar to the defendant's lies in Hill. 
t26 Likewise, in Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996), 
the supreme court reversed a grant of summary judgment after the 
district court refused to apply the concealment prong of the 
discovery rule. See id. at 47, 50. In that case, the defendant 
asked our supreme court to affirm because, in the defendant's 
view, two letters written by the plaintiff evincing suspicion of 
the defendant's wrongful conduct were enough to start the statute 
of limitations running such that the plaintiff's claims were 
time-barred.10 See id. at 50. The supreme court reversed and 
9. (...continued) 
motion to dismiss and hence our standard of review is more 
deferential to the plaintiff. We "must accept the factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and consider all reasonable 
inferences . . . from those facts in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff." Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991). 
We think the posture of this case weighs heavily in favor of 
reversal. 
10. Berenda 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996) was decided under a statute 
of limitations that contained an internal discovery rule like the 
fraud statute in this case. See id. at 51 n.2. Nevertheless, 
the court looked to case law decided under statutes of 
limitations without internal discovery rules because the 
plaintiff's allegations that the defendants fraudulently 
(continued...) 
remanded where the plaintiff "presented a prima facie case" of 
fraudulent -concealment because "weighing the reasonableness of 
the plaintiff's conduct" in the face of fraudulent concealment to 
determine whether the statute of limitations was tolled is the 
province of juries rather than judges. Id. at 53-54. 
[^27 In Chapman, our supreme court faced a "close call." 784 
P.2d at 1186. There, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss without 
prejudice their own malpractice suit against a physician after 
the defendants allegedly misled and misinformed the plaintiffs 
about the viability of their claim. See id. at 1183. After 
receiving medical records containing the facts underlying their 
cause of action, the plaintiffs later renewed their malpractice 
suit, but only after the statute normally would have run. See 
id. at 1183-84. Balancing the misinformation the plaintiffs 
allegedly received against the actions of the plaintiffs in light 
of this misinformation, the Chapman court determined the 
plaintiffs were "entitled to their day in court" and reversed a 
grant of summary judgment. Id. at 1186. The court left for the 
jury the determination of whether, given the defendant's 
concealment, the plaintiffs "were sufficiently alerted to the 
possibility of medical malpractice at the time of [their f 
daughter's] cardiac arrest to start the statute of limitations 
running or whether . . . [the plaintiffs] should reasonably have 
disregarded [the misinformation] and made an independent 
inquiry." Id. In essence, the court left for the fact-finder 
the determination of whether or not to apply the discovery rule. 
i[2 8 Russell's pleadings, set out above, clearly allege that the 
Appellees mislead and misinformed Russell as to CMT's true nature 
and involvement in the sale of the lots. Under our standard of 
review in a grant of a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and in light of 
the foregoing authority regarding the fact-finder's role in 
determining the applicability of the discovery rule, we hold the 
district court erred in granting the Appellees' motions to 
dismiss.n 
10. (...continued) 
concealed the plaintiff's claims required the court in either 
case to "balance[] the reasonableness of the plaintiff in 
pursuing its claim against the defendant's affirmative actions to 
conceal." Id. at 52. 
11. Because Russell's fraud claim is governed by a statute of 
limitations that includes an internal discovery rule, our 
analysis differs slightly from the foregoing concealment prong 
analysis. The pertinent statutory language provides that "[a]n 
action may be brought within three years . . . for relief on the 
ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action in 
(continued...) 
II. Standing as to Fraud Claim 
f29 Alternatively, the Appellees argue the district court 
properly dismissed Russell's fraud claim because Russell lacks 
standing to bring the claim.12 Russell alleges in the pleadings 
that when PRP was dissolved in 1997, PRP assigned to Russell "all 
of its rights, title and interest in the [PRP] Contract." 
Russell argues this assignment "includ[ed] any claims relating to 
the purchase of [the] lots." The Appellees argue, inter alia, 
that Russell lacks standing because it could not have legally 
acquired a cause of action for fraud from PRP through assignment. 
11. (...continued) 
such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-26(3) (2002) (emphasis added). Interpreting this 
statute, our supreme court held that "accrual of the cause of 
action is not complete until discovery of the pertinent facts" 
constituting the fraud. Hill, 2001 UT 16 at 1|l6 (citing Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3)). Hence, despite the Appellees1 
arguments to the contrary, "the question is not whether the 
discovery rule applies [to the fraud claim,] but [rather] when 
[Russell] discovered [its] cause of action [for fraud] and so 
triggered the running of the statute." Berenda, 914 P.2d at 56. 
As we have discussed above, determining when the statute of 
limitations began running is a fact question and, accordingly, we 
hold the district court erred in granting the Appellees' motions 
to dismiss the fraud claim. 
12. The Appellees argue Russell's fraud claim does not pass 
muster under rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which requires fraud be pleaded with particularity. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 9(b). To support this assertion, the Appellees argue, 
inter alia, that Russell failed to allege that the Appellees made 
direct misrepresentations to Russell with regard to the 
transactions involving the lots. However, the question is not 
one of direct misrepresentations, but rather one of false 
representations. See Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 
785, 792 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("A person cannot be liable for 
fraud unless he made the false representations himself, 
authorized someone to make them for him, or participated in the 
misrepresentation in some way, such as through a conspiracy."); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 533 (1965) ("The maker of a 
fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability for 
pecuniary loss to another who acts in justifiable reliance upon 
it if the misrepresentation, although not made directly to the 
other, is made to a third person and the maker intends or has 
reason to expect that its terms will be repeated or its substance 
communicated to the other, and that it will influence his conduct 
in the transaction . . . ." (emphasis added)). 
Accordingly, we must determine whether a fraud claim is 
assignable in Utah. 
H3 0 We conclude that Mayer v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 63 P.2d 611 
(1936), is controlling in this appeal. The facts and procedural 
posture of Mayer are strikingly similar to those we face here. 
In Mayer, the plaintiff brought a claim against the defendant for 
fraud alleging that the defendant " 'devised a scheme to defraud 
the plaintiff's assignors . . . by selling them stock . . . at 
false and fictitious values.1" Id. at 613. Based on the 
defendant's misrepresentations, the plaintiff's assignors 
purchased the stock at a price higher than its actual trading 
value, providing the defendant with significant ill-gotten 
profits. See id. at 613-614. The defendant moved to dismiss the 
plaintiff's action, asserting the plaintiff lacked standing to 
bring the fraud claim because a cause of action for fraud was not 
assignable. See id. at 612, 616. The supreme court noted that 
although tort claims were not assignable at common law, "the rule 
of nonassignability no longer extends to all actions arising [in 
tort]" under Utah law. Id. (citing Wines v. Rio Grande W. Ry. 
Co., 9 Utah 228, 33 P. 1042, 1045 (1893) (holding that an action 
for negligent destruction of property is assignable); National 
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 
653, 654 (1913) (same); Lawler v. Jennings, 18 Utah 35, 55 P. 60, 
61 (18 98) (holding that an action for money overpaid by mutual 
mistake is assignable); Baglin v. Earl-Eagle Min. Co., 54 Utah 
572, 184 P. 190, 193 (1919) (holding that a cause of action for 
conversion is assignable)). The Mayer court also pointed out 
that the Utah Supreme Court had previously held an action to 
recover stock secured by fraud was an assignable claim. Id. at 
616 (citing White v. Texas Co., 59 Utah 180, 202 P. 826, 830 
(1921)) . In light of these prior holdings, the Mayer court could 
find "no good reason why an action for the recovery of money 
secured by fraud is not likewise assignable." Id. The Mayer 
court held that "[w]hile a mere naked right to recover for fraud 
is not assignable, . . . the weight of authority and . . . sound 
legal principles [persuade us that] an assignment is upheld when 
it carries with it a subsisting substantial right to property 
independent of the right to sue for fraud." Id. at 616-17. The 
supreme court reversed the district court's dismissal and 
remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the plaintiff's 
fraud claim. See id. at 618. 
^31 We find Mayer indistinguishable from the present appeal. 
Just as in Mayer, Russell alleges that the Appellees1 fraudulent 
misrepresentations induced PRP to execute a real estate purchase 
contract in which PRP agreed to pay a higher price for the 
property than that for which it was presently selling. Like the 
defendant in Mayer, the Appellees pocketed the ill-gotten profit 
at the plaintiff's expense. In both cases, the property that the 
plaintiffs seek to recover through their fraud claims is the 
money "had [by the plaintiffs] and received [fraudulently by the 
defendants]." Id. at 615. And like the plaintiff in Mayer, 
Russell brought its fraud claim in the capacity of an assignee. 
Thus, applying Mayer, we reverse the dismissal on the fraud claim 
and allow Russell to pursue its claims against the Appellees. 
III. Fiduciary Duty as to Bustos 
1(3 2 Russell contends the district court erred in dismissing 
Russell's claims against Bustos. Bustos argues that he could not 
have defrauded Russell because he never made any kind of 
representation to PRP or Russell. Also, Bustos insists he owed 
PRP and Russell no duty as a fiduciary, and that he therefore had 
no duty to reveal his knowledge of the fraudulent scheme. 
U33 Generally, "silence . . . in the absence of a duty to speak 
. . . does not of itself constitute fraud." 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 18 
(1997) (footnotes and citations omitted); cf. Jenson v. IHC 
Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 333 (Utah 1997) ("The party's silence 
must amount to fraud.") . However, "[a] n exception to the 
[general] rule . . . exists where the circumstances impose on a 
person a duty to speak and he or she deliberately remains 
silent." 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 19 (footnote and citation omitted); 
see Jenson, 944 P.2d at 333. Furthermore, "[p]arties who 
knowingly join a fiduciary in fraudulent acts, whereby the 
fiduciary breaches his or her fiduciary duties, are jointly and 
severally liable with that fiduciary." 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and 
Deceit, § 306 (2001) (citing Future Group, II v. Nationsbank, 478 
S.E.2d 45 (S.C. 1996) (stating " [t]he gravamen of the claim [of 
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty] is the 
defendant's knowing participation in the fiduciary's breach.")),* 
see also United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 
P.2d 880, 884-885 (Utah 1993) (reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment involving a cause of action for aiding and abetting a 
fraud by breach of fiduciary duty). 
[^34 Russell alleges in its complaint that: (1) Bustos schemed 
with Thomas and Carson to purchase the lots and fraudulently 
resell them to PRP; (2) Bustos made overt acts and 
representations to induce Saratoga to sell the lots to CMT in the 
belief that CMT was affiliated with PRP; (3) Bustos, along with 
Carson and Thomas, made an offer to purchase the lots from 
Saratoga through CMT for $25,000 per lot; (4) Bustos converted 
and used Russell's proprietary development plans to further 
disguise CMT's illegitimacy; (5) Bustos was a member of Poe, the 
company that sent a $10,000 earnest money wire to the title 
company to close the CMT contract; (6) Bustos received money in 
the form of a check at the closing of the CMT contract; (7) 
Bustos agreed to conceal from PRP the true nature of the "flip 
purchase and sell" of the lots; (8) Bustos was a real estate 
agent for Wardley along with Cary and Carson, both of whom 
represented PRP; and (9) Bustos interjected himself, along with 
Carson and Thomas, as undisclosed agents and principals for CMT 
and Poe, while acting as agents and fiduciaries of PRP. 
1(35 Based on these allegations and reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, we accept that Bustos made overt acts and 
representations for the purpose of inducing PRP to execute the 
PRP contract. We also accept that Bustos schemed with the 
Appellees to commit fraud and later agreed to conceal the fraud 
in furtherance of the scheme. Likewise, we accept that Bustos 
aided Carson and Thomas in breaching their fiduciary duties 
toward PRP.13 Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the fraud 
claim against Bustos and remand for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
1136 For the purposes of surviving a rule 12(b) (6) motion to 
dismiss, we conclude the concealment prong of the discovery rule 
applies to toll the statutes of limitations on Russell's claims 
such that Russell's complaint was timely. Because Utah law 
allows the assignment of a fraud claim, we conclude Russell has 
standing to bring its cause of action for fraud. Finally, we 
hold that Russell's allegations that Bustos committed fraud 
either by making false representations or by breaching fiduciary 
duties are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. In short, 
we are not convinced that Russell cannot prove any set of facts 
13. Russell alleges that Bustos did owe fiduciary duties to PRP. 
In the posture of this case, we agree. Bustos was a real estate 
agent with Wardley. Both Cary and Carson were Wardley agents at 
the time the PRP contract was negotiated and executed. Cary 
listed the lots and Carson represented PRP in its attempts to 
purchase the lots. Bustos communicated with both Cary and Carson 
regarding the lots. Bustos received money from transactions 
involving the lots. Arguably, Bustos was an agent for PRP 
because Wardley represented PRP. In fact, Russell alleges in its 
complaint that Bustos "act[ed] as agent[] and fiduciar[y] of 
[PRP] at the time the PRP contract was negotiated and executed." 
The determination of "[w]hether or not a confidential or 
fiduciary relationship exists depends on the facts and 
circumstances of each individual case." First Sec. Bank of Utah 
v. Banberry Dev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1332 (Utah 1990) 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
to support its claims, and therefore we reverse and remand for 
further proceedings. 
m. 
idith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
J37 I CONCUR: 
A. Thorne C Wiliia 
1(3 8 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
'jk 
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